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TORTS-WIFE'S RIGHT TO SUE HUSBAND
Wife brought an action to recover damages from her husband
for injuries alleged to be caused by his gross negligence in driving
an automobile in which she was riding before their marriage.
Husband filed a plea in bar denying wife's right to maintain this
action because after the accident they had married. Held; no action
lies. Furey v. Furey, 193 Va. 727, 71 S.E.2d 191 (1952).
By this decision the highest court of Virginia has committed
itself to the proposition that a wife cannot maintain an action
against her husband for a personal tort committed by him against
her before their marriage. The court's reasoning regarding antenuptial torts is in accord with decided cases in at least twenty-one
jurisdictions in the United States as to negligence between husband
and wife: District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Vermont; and in at
least nine jurisdictions in the United States as to tort action between husband and wife: California, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia ;'
and represents the weight of authority given by the cases cited
2
herein.
At common law, husband and wife were one person-for the
wife to sue the husband in tort would be for the husband to sue
himself.3 "Upon this principle of an union in person of husband and
wife depend almost all the legal rights, duties, and disabilities that
either of them acquired by marriage." 4 By the act of marriage it is
alleged that the parties thereto establish a unit of society which automatically carries with it primary obligations which cannot be extinguished without reducing the estate of marriage to a mere licensed cohabitation; to allow the wife to sue the husband for a
personal tort would upset the dignity and harmony of the home.
"It is perhaps idle to speculate at this late date as to how far
the historical basis of this common law rule is attributable to a mixture of the Bible and medieval metaphysics, the position of the
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27 Geo. L J. 696. 893 at 922 (1939).
McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204,135 P.2d 940 (1943); Patenaude v. Patenaude.
195 Minn. 523 263 N.W. 546 (1935); Buckeye v. Buckeye. 203 Wis. 248. 234 N.W.
342 (1931); Spector v. Weisman, 40 F.2d 792 (App. D.C 1930).
Prosser. Torts § 99. P. 898 (1941).
1 BI. Comm. 442.

father of the family in Roman law, the natural law concept of the
family as an informal unit of government, or the property law of
feudalism." 5 But whatever the historical basis the result was that
neither spouse could maintain an action against the other for a personal or property tort whether it was committed before or during
marriage ;6 and the action is not maintainable even after divorce or
death of the husband.7 Nor, by the weight of authority does the fact
that the husband carried liability insurance have any bearing, partly
because of fear of collusion between husband and wife, and partly
because of the technical argument that the insurance company is
not liable unless the insured is liable.8
It is generally agreed that a mere provision that a married
woman may sue and be sued affects only the adjective law and that
a substantive right must be found elsewhere in the statute. 9 The
Supreme Court of Appeals in Furey v. Furey, interpreted § 55-36
of the Code of Virginia emancipating married women10 as creating
no substantive rights but rather as meaning that if the wife had an
existing cause of action at time of suit, then she can sue in her own
name. No section of the Code of Virginia gives the wife a right to
sue her husband for a personal antenuptial tort.
Modern progress and thought have advanced so far as to render the fiction of law that husband and wife are one practically obsolete; it should be disregarded in this instance and a more reasonable and up-to-date view taken, which will permit a woman, though
married, to maintain a personal, tort action against her husband.
A considerable minority of the courts with unanimous approval
of legal writers 11 have followed the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Harlan in Thompson v. Thompson1 2 rejecting as specious
the following arguments: (1) against public policy as tending to
stir up family discord; (2) danger of fictitious and fradulent
claims; (3) possibility of trivial actions for minor annoyances; (4)
stare decisis; (5) strict construction of statutes changing common
law; and (6) adequate remedy in criminal and divorce laws. They
have also construed the Married Woman's Acts to permit an action
5

2 Bryce. Studies in History and Jurisprudence 819 (1901).

6: Prosser, Torts § 99. p 899.
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HeSeger v. Lomas, 1 5 Ind. 287.44 N.E. 462 (1896).
Shaker v. Shaker. 129 Conn. 518. 29 A.2d 765 (1942).
38 Harv. L Rev. 383. 386 (1925)
10. VL Code Ann. § 55-36 (150) ("A married woman may contract and be contracted
with and sue and be sued in the same manner and with the same consequences as if
she were unmarried whether the risht or liability asserted by or against her shall have
accrued heretofore or hereafter...).
11. 43 Harv. law Rev. 1030 (1930).
12. 218 U.S. 611 (1910).

9.

by either spouse for a personal tort pommitted by the other, whether
13
it be intentional or negligent in character.
An interesting sidelight of Furey v. Furey, is that the husband
carried the usual type of liability insurance. No mention of that
fact is made in the case. 14 As heretofore stated the decision of
Furey v. Furey, is based on sanctity of the family. But just how
relieving insurance companies and putting the burden on the family,
one or more of whom have just suffered a serious injury, promotes
domestic bliss is beyond this writer's power to comprehend. If the
engaged couple had wrongfully broken the engagement a recovery
would have been allowed; if they had postponed marriage a recovery would have been allowed. Does it not seem strange indeed
that the wife should be penalized because she kept her marriage
contract and consumated the marriage? It has been suggested that
there is too much danger of collusion in the husband-wife cases.
However, it is doubtful that there is any less danger where the
parties are engaged rather than married and besides, why should
those innocent of collusion be punished because of a possibility
that others might collude? The risk of collusion is one common to
every type of insurance and is presumably taken into consideration
in the process of rate-making.
An analysis of the problem presented in an Oklahoma decision
leaves no worthy justification for the majority rule.15 A legal
maxim clearly applicable is, "Reason is the soul of the law, and
when the reason of any particular law ceases, so should the law
itself."1 6 The courts holding that a wife cannot sue her husband
for personal injuries do not deny that their statutes allow the wife
to sue the husband for a tort against her property.17 The result of
the majority view in essence is, therefore, that the wife may sue
her husband for conversion of her chattel, but cannot sue him to recover damages for the loss of an arm.
It is submitted that the minority rule allowing recovery is the
better rule. Unfortunately our decisions have so committed our
Supreme Court of Appeals that our only recourse to remedy this
defect in our law seems to be to the legislature.19
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Courmeyv. Courme. 184 Oki. 395. 87 P.2d 660 (1938);Riv Rains 97 Colo. 19,
46 P.2d 740 (1935) ; Brown v. Brown. 88 Conn. 42. 89 A. 889 (1914).
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Coutney v. .o ey. sapro.
Broom's Legal Maxims 159 (7th ed.).
Cour=n v. Courtney, supra. 87 P.2d at 667.
For fu'dhe comment see 38 Va. L Rev. 973 (1952).

